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NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: MORE QUESTIONS
THAN ANSWERS
HON. DAVID B. SENTELLE*
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
the reactions to those attacks, and more recently the armed conflict
in Iraq have raised, or more accurately raised anew, a host of questions concerning the law of national security. Because I think the bar
and especially the bench and the legal academy should be thinking
about those questions, I am going to raise many of them for your
thoughts and discussion, but I will not attempt to answer very many
of them, both because the answers may not be fixed, and because I
want to retain the openness necessary to deal with them should I
confront them in an Article III context. Nonetheless, I want to offer
them up for your consideration. The first question: Is national security law really law?1 Many cynical students and observers of law and
politics would say no. That is, they would assert that what we call
national security law is simply a fig leaf, or a collection of fig leaves
to cover whatever the political branches decide to do in the name of
national security or national defense, hiding the fact that national
security law is really not law at all. Moreover, cynics would contend
that it is just a collection of ad hoc policy decisions with essentially
post hoc declarations of discretion and vague references to inherent
authority, rubberstamping—either through the courts or policy announcements of one sort or another—providing titular legitimization
for whatever the President or the congressional majority (or sometimes minority) intended to do from the very beginning. The cynical
view undermines—at least in the field of national security—the
American fundamental concept that ours is a government of laws
and not men—a government of principles and not whim, arbitrariness, or caprice. I disagree.
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Prior to his appointment to the D.C. Circuit in 1987, Judge Sentelle served on the United
States District Court, Western District of North Carolina, in Ashville. He is a 1968 graduate of the University of North Carolina Law School.
Judge Sentelle delivered these remarks in a speech to the faculty of the Florida State
University College of Law on March 28, 2003. The Judge thanks Joseph R. Coker for adding footnotes to his Manuscript.
1. Here I will give credit to a group of writers in the field of national security law, to
whom I owe a great debt for much of the organization of my remarks today, Stephen
Dycus, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, editors of a national
security law textbook published by Aspen Law and Business. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
(Stephen Dycus et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). I also want to credit Retired Colonel Scott Silliman, United States Air Force, who is the Director of the Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security at Duke University Law School, with whom I have had the good fortune to
have frequent consultation over the last year and a half about the subject of national security.
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I am not either naive enough or idealistic enough to assert that
there is not some element of truth in the cynical view. Nonetheless, I
think it is significant, indeed crucially important, that the bench, the
bar, and perhaps especially the legal academy continue to debate the
legal underpinnings of our nation’s foreign policy, its national security policy, and its national defense. Granted, there is a prevalent,
indeed a respected and perhaps respectable, tradition for the proposition my country right or wrong. There is, of course, a countertradition of more recent origin, but of disturbing prevalence, especially in the academy, that my country right or wrong is wrong. The
proponents, whether self-recognized or not, of each of these views,
have already made up their minds, without regard to the actual legality of any decision or act of the foreign relations or national security, that the acts of the nation are to be defended, applauded, and
upheld on the one hand, or condemned, denegrated, protested, and
set aside on the other. Neither of these approaches, however, explains why, after well over 200 years of national constitutional history, the American bar, bench, and legal academy continue to explore, expound, and debate the legitimacy of the acts taken by government in the furtherance of foreign policy and the defense of national security. That healthier tradition can only be explained and
understood insofar as it is part of, and obedient to, the tradition of
the rule of law—even in the confused, constantly changing, and
frankly dangerous world of national security.
With that said, assuming that I am correct that national security
law is indeed law, What are the subsidiary questions that we should
be considering within that realm? Is there a legal basis for the use of
military force in foreign conflict without a declaration of war? This is
a question that is currently under litigation in the First Circuit, arising from a lawsuit brought by a number of members of Congress in
the District Court for Massachusetts, to which the circuit has recently returned the litigation for further proceedings.2 It is a question
likely to give rise to further litigation in other federal courts.3
At the risk of being accused of too much levity in the choice of
analogy, I would say that this question is in a limited way parallel to
the subject of romance: Each generation thinks it has discovered it
2. See Doe I v. Bush, No. CIV. A. 03-10284-JLT, 2003 WL 21142782 (D. Mass. Feb.
27, 2003), aff’d, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003).
3. Now let me say here at the outset that I do not intend to comment on that or any
other pending litigation. There are ethical strictures against comment by federal judges on
pending litigation, whether in our own courts or others, and although I think I am well
within the exception to that stricture for comment within academic settings, I am not going
to push the envelope by litigation-specific commentary. I simply wish to put forward for
academic thought and review, in very sketchy fashion, the history of the controversy. In
doing so, I recognize that it raises a great many subsidiary questions, at least some of
which I will raise following some discussion of the general topic.
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anew, but it has always been with us. We need not look back very far
to see the political opposition first to President Johnson and then to
President Nixon on the subject of the Vietnam War. Understand that
I do not mean the word political in a negative sense, but only in a descriptive or generic one. Before that, a different set of political opponents questioned with similar seriousness the legitimacy of President
Truman’s use of force and concomitant domestic powers in the pursuit of the Korean conflict.4 But the controversy did not first arise in
the twentieth century. There have been uses of military force in international conflict without declaration of war virtually since the beginning of the Republic.5 To put the question into the framework of
law, as opposed to political controversy, I would call your attention to
the case of Bas v. Tingy.6 That decision has the unusual distinction of
being one of the few decisions of the Supreme Court that still has any
apparent importance issued before the appointment of Chief Justice
John Marshall.7
In the late eighteenth century, relations between the new nation
of the United States and the older nation of France had deteriorated
far more than they have in the last few months. We had reached a
state of armed conflict, albeit generally limited to conflict on the seas,
but a conflict which resulted in vessels operating under French colors
attacking and seizing United States-owned vessels.8 But there was
no declaration of war. Indeed, the conflict is and was generally referred to as the Quasi-War.9 Congress passed two acts providing for
salvage rights of the former owners of the seized United States vessels upon their recapture.10 Captain Tingy was the commander of the
public armed ship Ganges which had recaptured the Eliza, a ship belonging to John Bas, after its capture by a French privateer.11 Tingy

4. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 178 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“When one considers the sheer number of military campaigns undertaken during this
country’s history, declarations of war are the exception rather than the rule, beginning
with the undeclared but Congressionally authorized naval war against France in the
1790’s . . . .”); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33,
38–51 (1995) (discussing the early practices of presidential use of force without legislative
approval).
6. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
7. To digress for a moment, some time for your own entertainment, go back and pull
the first four volumes of the United States Reports, now generally published as one and a
half volumes, and look over the cases. You will not find very much that could be cited as
precedent for anything that is heard by the Supreme Court or any other federal court today. But that is a digression.
8. STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 643-45 (Oxford University Press 1993).
9. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 5, at 41.
10. Bas, 4 U.S. at 37.
11. Id.
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brought an action in libel for salvage.12 If the action was governed by
the 1798 act of Congress, then he was entitled to one-eighth the
value of the Eliza.13 Under the 1799 act, he was entitled to one-half
the value.14 The 1798 act referred expressly to recapture from “the
French.”15 The 1799 act referred to recapture from “the enemy.”16 Although not phrased in precisely the same language we might have
used in the twentieth or twenty-first century, the issue underlying
the controversy was: Could there be an enemy in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war?17 As was the custom in those preMarshall days, there was not an opinion that was literally the opinion of the Court, each justice wrote for himself and the Court entered
a judgment. Both Justices Bushrod Washington and Samuel Chase
handed down interesting opinions addressing the undeclared war
question. In so doing, they laid the foundation for the proposition
that war may be conducted without a formal declaration of war.
Justice Washington stated, “that every contention by force between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their
respective governments, is not only war, but public war.”18 He came
rather directly to grips with the declaration of war question, stating,
“[i]f it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect
kind; because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation.”19 But he went on to insist that, “hostilities may subsist between
two nations more confined in its nature and extent; being limited as
to places, persons, and things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn . . . . Still, however, it is public
war.”20 Were they enemies? Well, Justice Washington went on to
point out that armed vessels of the two nations were combating on
the high seas in order to subdue each other and make prizes of the
property of the other. “They certainly were not friends . . . [i]f they
were not our enemies, I know not what constitutes an enemy.”21
Justice Chase phrased his analysis differently. He spoke in terms
of the difference between Congress declaring a general war and waging a limited war.22 He set out four acts authorized by the American
government “demonstrative [of a] state of war.”23 As he observed, by

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 37, 40.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
See id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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acts of Congress an American vessel was authorized: (1) to resist
search by a French public vessel; (2) to capture any vessel that
should attempt by force to compel submission to a search; (3) to recapture any American vessel seized by a French vessel; and (4) to
capture any French armed vessel found on the high seas.24 Even in
the absence of a declaration of war, he had “no hesitation in pronouncing, [sic] that a partial war exists between America and
France.”25 The Court was unanimous.
I do not suggest that this single decision of the Supreme Court answers for all time or all circumstances the question of legitimacy of
undeclared war, but I do suggest that it offers eloquent testimony to
the antiquity of the question. And so it has gone through our history.
Five times the United States has fought declared wars: (1) the War of
1812 against Great Britain; (2) the 1846 war with Mexico; (3) the
1898 Spanish-American War; (4) World War I beginning in 1917; and
(5) World War II beginning in 1941.26 Technically, there have been
eleven declarations of war, because both the world wars involved
multiple declarations against multiple enemies, but there have been
only five declared wars.27 But at least ten more times the Commander-in-Chief has committed American troops in extended military
engagements based upon some authorization by Congress stopping
short of a formal declaration of war. That would include the undeclared naval war with France, the two wars against the Barbary pirates beginning in 1801 and 1815, the raids on the slave traffic in
1820 to 1823, the operation against Paraguay to seek redress for attack on a naval vessel in 1859, the Lebanese incursion to protect an
in-place government against insurrection in 1958, the Vietnam War
from 1964 to 1973, the restoration of the Lebanese government in
1982, the Gulf War in 1991,28 and the Afghanistan incursion against
Al Qaeda terrorists following the events of September 11, 2001.29 Add
to this the current conflict in Iraq,30 the extended undeclared war in
Korea during the Truman administration, and Clinton’s Bosnian operation—each use arguably authorized under United Nations, authority theretofore legitimated by congressional action31—and we
24. Id. at 44.
25. Id. at 45.
26. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-1999 (1999) [hereinafter USE OF ARMED FORCES].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. U.S. Strikes Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2001, at C14; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (congressional resolution authorizing the use of force “against those responsible for the recent attacks
launched against the United States [on September 11, 2001]”).
30. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2003) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE].
31. See USE OF ARMED FORCES, supra note 26.
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have at least twelve uses of force conducted by the Executive and approved to a greater or lesser degree by congressional action without
formal declaration of war. Again, I do not suggest that this answers
the question of the existence, and certainly not the extent, of the constitutional authority of the United States government, whether in its
executive or legislative branches, to conduct undeclared war, but I do
offer it as historic evidence for consideration in any analysis of that
question.
Subsidiary to the question of the constitutionality vel non of undeclared war is the question of the relative authority of the executive
and legislative branches in the conduct of foreign affairs, and specifically in the management of national security and the conduct of military conflict. In what order should we consider them? There are two
ways of ordering the questions. We might first look to the national
security powers of Congress since the powers of the legislative
branch are first addressed in the Constitution.32 Conversely, we
might consider the Executive first since, historically and currently,
legitimacy has been questioned more often, indeed far more often,
with respect to the Commander-in-Chief’s use of armed forces than in
the area of Congress’s authority to, on the one hand, authorize or, on
the other, interfere with the President’s claimed authority to authorize military action.33 Let us start with the Congress, perhaps because
it is at least facially an easier realm. I might even suggest answers to
some questions here. For example, What are the sources in the Constitution for Congress’s authority to deal with national security? The
plainest source is Section 8 of Article I. That section affords to Congress the general power to “provide for the common Defense . . . of
the United States.”34 Granted, it may be argued that the very generality of that introductory language deems it a reliable source for determining a specific grant of power. But specific clauses of that section speak with eloquent specificity to the power of Congress to:
[D]eclare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies . . .; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States . . . .35

32.
33.
34.
35.

See U.S. CONST. art. I.
See Yoo, supra note 4, at 170-71.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id.
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All of these grants of power are amplified by the last paragraph of
Section 8, the famous Necessary and Proper Clause empowering the
Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”36
Additionally, might not Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, although
phrased in terms of limitation, be cited as additional sources of congressional authority? That is, Section 9 provides that “the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.”37
Could that not be taken as a grant to Congress the power to suspend
the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus in the case of rebellion or invasion? Granted, that suspension, when it has occurred or been attempted, has generally been at the hands of the executive and not
the legislature.38 However, does not the placement of Section 9 in article I, the legislative article, rather than Article II, the executive article, suggest an implicit grant to the Congress rather than the President?39
As for Section 10, the Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal.”40 Again, might not the limitation of Section 10
on the states, especially coupled with the specific grant of the letters
of marque and reprisal authority in Section 8, strengthen the implication of congressional primacy in foreign relations and in national
defense in particular?
Even more specifically, in the third paragraph of Section 10, the
Constitution provides that “No state shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power, or engage
36. Id.
37. Id. § 9.
38. On April 27, 1861, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in response to rioting in Baltimore and the burning of several railroad bridges north of Baltimore, ordered by the Governor of Maryland, to prevent federal troops from entering the
city. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 20-25
(1998).
39. In Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), Chief
Justice Taney stated that “[t]he clause of the [C]onstitution, which authorizes the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is in the 9th section of the first article.
This article is devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the
slightest reference to the executive department.” The Chief Justice went on to state that if
the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was intended to be bestowed upon the
President, “it would undoubtedly be found in [the] plain words in [Article II of the Constitution]; but there is not a word in it that can furnish the slightest ground to justify the exercise of the power.” Id. at 149. For a discussion of the historical underpinnings of Ex parte
Merryman, see REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 26-39.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay.”41 The states cannot do that alone. But can they
not do it with the consent of Congress? And, are these not parallel to
powers expressly granted to Congress in Section 8? Might one then
argue that the grants of power to Congress in the field of national defense and national security are broad, numerous, and explicit?
Is it a surprise, then, that currently and historically it is almost
without exception the President who has taken the lead in the commitment of national resources and, specifically, the armed forces in
the pursuit of national defense and national security? I referred earlier to the five times that the United States has fought wars upon
congressional declaration of war. I believe it is safe to say that in
each of those instances Congress acted upon the request of the President, whether it was Monroe, Polk, McKinley, or Franklin D. Roosevelt. The twelve times in which Presidents have committed troops
under color of some congressional authorization stopping short of a
declaration of war have rather obviously begun at presidential insistance, not congressional. This lays aside the fact that there have
been numerous instances of presidential use of armed forces without
congressional action. In recent years, including by way of example
and not exhaustion, President Ford’s use of the armed forces in the
rescue of the Mayaguez, President Carter’s attempted rescue of the
hostages in Iran, and President Reagan’s Grenada incursion.42 If
Congress has all the constitutional grants of power to which I earlier
alluded, what are the sources of the President’s power to conduct national defense or national security operations? Again, let us look first
to the Constitution.
First, is it relevant that the Constitution expressly provides that
the President will take an oath to, inter alia, “preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States”?43 Does the wording of
that oath implicitly suggest that he will use all powers otherwise his
in that defense? Does that include the power to use the armed forces?
More explicitly, Article II, Section 2, provides: “The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States.”44 Does that simply mean that
the President is the chief general or admiral, or does it further empower him in the use of armed forces for the national defense?

41. Id.
42. See USE OF ARMED FORCES, supra note 26; see also Yoo, supra note 4, at 181 (discussing the Mayaguez incident, the attempted hostage rescue in Iran, and the Grenada incursion in calling into question the success of the War Powers Resolution).
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
44. Id.
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The second paragraph of that same section provides that the
President “shall have Power . . . to make Treaties.”45 Is it significant
that the President makes the treaties, while Congress (and only one
house at that) has only the power to reject or accept what the President has done?46 Even conceding that, over the years, the Senate has
forced the modification of treaties by conditional ratifications,47 does
it suggest that the President has primacy in the field of foreign relations? Is such an assertion of primacy amplified by his power under
Article II, Section 2, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, and especially by his power under Article II, Section 3, to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers [from
other countries]” to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed
[without reservation for any congressional primacy in defense or international relations] and . . . [to] Commission all the Officers of the
United States”?48
Aside from those explicit grants of power to the President, are
there other sources for an executive claim to national security powers? Note that Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, on behalf of President Carter,49 Central Intelligence Associate Counsel Mitchell Rogovin, on behalf of President Reagan,50 and various other presidential
counsel, attorneys general, secretaries of relevant departments, and
other executive officials including the presidents themselves, have
asserted such claims throughout history. What other sources of public power might there be for presidential assertion of authority in the
field of national security? Do the explicit powers in Article II of the
Constitution carry with them the implication of more power? We
might refer generally to the powers in Article II as the President’s
commander-in-chief powers, foreign relations powers, and executive
powers. Do those fragmented powers create a whole that is greater
than the sum of their parts? Are there other powers, perhaps what
we might call emergency powers, that are inherent in that branch of
government, which has to see to the execution of law, while Congress
is generally charged with the making of laws, and was, at least in the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S.
Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 95-122 (1997) (discussing the frequency of
conditional ratification of treaties by the Senate and the general types of conditions that
are placed on ratification).
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. § 3.
49. See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785,
811 n.132 (1984).
50. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 904 (1994) (citing the statement of Mitchell
Rogovin before the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the proposition that Presidents have claimed authority, under their powers over foreign affairs, to conduct some
military operations without congressional approval).
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eighteenth century, expected to be in session only a rather small part
of the time? If there are inherent and emergency powers, how broad
are these powers?
I would be remiss at this point if I did not note, at least as a significant aside, that the Supreme Court has discussed these questions
in various forms and at various times. I think it would be generally
conceded that the most comprehensive and, at the same time, the
most fundamental analysis by the Supreme Court can be found in
the fragmented opinion of the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer51 (commonly known as the Steel Seizure Case). I will not
attempt to cover that case to exhaustion in this aside.52
In the Steel Seizure Case, as you may recall, President Truman,
acting under rather general grants of authority related to the deployment of U.S. forces to Korea, actually seized steel mills.53 The
whole litigation is about his authority to do so. The acting Attorney
General, arguing at the court of appeals level, took the inherent authority concept to its extreme—arguing that the President by virtue
of the vesting of the Executive power in him under Article II, inherited all the Executive authority of the crown at the time of the Declaration of Independence.54 Is there an inherent authority extending
that far? Hint: The United States did not make that argument in the
Supreme Court. Was it a silly argument? Perhaps, but just fifteen
years earlier, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the
Supreme Court had joined seven-to-one in an opinion by Justice
Sutherland that described the federal government as having all powers of external sovereignty and declaring that “the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,”
based in part on a similar theory.55 Does that argument have validity
today? Note: Justice Sutherland quoted John Marshall as stating
“[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”56 That was
John Marshall. Does that strengthen the argument any today? Well,
perhaps the President is the nation’s sole representative with the
foreign nations, but is he the sole agent when we look to national defense and the conduct of national security operations, specifically
51. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
52. It takes me two hours in a seminar course to come anywhere close to an exhaustive treatment, and it is a principle theme to the National Security Law text to which I earlier alluded, see Dycus, et al., supra note 1, as well as most other writing on the question of
presidential authority, even that which is not limited to national security law. But back to
the questions about the President’s authority.
53. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83.
54. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 751, 759-60 (1986).
55. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
56. Id. at 319 (internal quotes omitted).
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war? Hint: Justice Sutherland was cheating when he quoted Marshall. Marshall was not on the Supreme Court at the time he made
the statement; he was a member of Congress arguing (successfully)
that President Adams had not committed an impeachable offense by
turning over to the British for trial a British subject charged with
murder in his own country.57 Note: Adams was acting pursuant to the
Jay Treaty that Congressman Marshall had helped to negotiate.
Back to the more fundamental questions: What is the power of the
President to use troops without a declaration of war, or to commit
troops to undeclared operations without specific congressional authorization? Can it be seriously contended that he does not have the
emergency power to commit troops if we are actually invaded, or if
there is an actual insurrection, for example, if the State of South
Carolina fires on Fort Sumter? Aside from those emergencies, or perhaps even including them, what is the effect and what is the legitimacy of the War Powers Resolution?
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution for the express purpose of “fulfill[ing] the intent of the framers of the Constitution and insur[ing] that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities.”58 It requires, inter alia, that the President shall “in every possible instance . . . consult with Congress before” sending armed forces into hostilities or situations of imminent
hostility, and regularly until the armed forces are no longer so engaged.59 Section 4 of the Resolution60 deals expressly with the use of
armed forces without a declaration of war and requires the President
within 48 hours after the introduction of forces into hostilities to
submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tem of the Senate setting forth the circumstances necessitating the
introduction of armed forces, the constitutional or legislative authority under which such introduction took place, and the estimated
scope and duration of the hostilities involved.61 It further requires
that at least once every six months thereafter he report periodically

57. H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1511-12 (1999); see also LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL, A LIFE IN LAW 318-23 (1974). Note that President Adams was acting pursuant to
the Jay Treaty, of which John Marshall was a key public supporter in 1895. For an overview of the negotiation, ratification, and subsequent public discourse over the John Jay
Treaty, see id. at 201-12.
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2003).
59. Id. § 1542.
60. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §1543 (2000)).
61. Id.
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to the Congress on the status of the hostilities as well as the scope
and duration.62
Section 5 of the Resolution63 requires, inter alia, that within 60
days after the submission of a report or after the date upon which
such report is required, the President is to
[T]erminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to
which such report was submitted . . . unless the Congress (l) has
declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixtyday period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an
armed attack upon the United States.64

I believe it is correct to state that every President since the enactment of the Resolution has expressed misgivings about the Resolution, conspicuously including Gerald Ford, the most legislative man
to serve as the Chief Executive during the twentieth century. However, Presidents have generally complied with it.65 But they have
done so, as Ford declared in the John Sherman Cooper Lectures after
his presidency, without conceding that it is constitutional or binding.66 Ford said he consulted with the Congress simply because he
thought it was common sense and it would strengthen the trust between the executive and legislative branches.67 With that said, I
think we are left with two broad questions, perhaps covering many
subsidiary ones. These two broad questions are among those that I
do not purport to answer. The first is based on the assertion of some
presidentialists that this Resolution is an unconstitutional congressional usurpation of the President’s Executive, Commander-in-Chief,
or inherent power. Are they correct? Some legislative proponents
have argued that the Resolution is not only constitutional, but that it
is enacting constitutional requirements, that is, that even in the absence of the Resolution the President would be required to seek congressional authorization (perhaps not on precisely these strict schedules set out in the Resolution) and to cease operations if not congressionally authorized. Is that a valid argument? I did not say I would
ask only easy questions, I did say that I would not be expressing
opinions on many of them. The War Powers Resolution is one of those
areas in which I will not be expressing an opinion.

62. Id.
63. Id. § 5.
64. Id.
65. See PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 11-13.
66. See President Gerald R. Ford, The War Powers Resolution, Alfred M. Landon Lectures on Public Issues given at Kansas State University (Feb. 20, 1978), available at
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/780220.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2003).
67. Id.
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The next question I would raise, and the last one on this level of
generality is, do the courts have a role in national security law? After
all, the Constitution does provide that “the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution
[and] the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under
their Authority.”68 If I am correct that national security law is indeed
law, does that not presuppose that we have a role? Are we not, after
all, the branch charged with the duty of saying what the law is?
Certainly we have some role in such specific areas as the limitations on Executive and perhaps Legislative authority to, for example,
conduct surveillance together prior to requiring intelligence information. In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978,
Congress has created a whole special court staffed by district judges
selected by the Chief Justice to pass upon applications for and issue
orders permitting the use of electronic surveillance (including wiretaps) to obtain foreign intelligence information.69 That court has exercised its power ever since. Under the original act, the wording of
the statute was such that the court understood it to be its duty to determine that the wiretaps were not used in the furtherance of criminal investigations, otherwise put, that the gathering of foreign intelligence was “the purpose” of the electronic surveillance.70 In the Patriot Act Amendment to the statute after the tragedies of September
11, the statute recited that the gathering of foreign intelligence must
be “a significant purpose.”71 The FISA Court held that it was constitutionally required to insure that the foreign intelligence gathering
remained the primary purpose72 and that the wiretaps did not become a shortcut to criminal investigation in cases in which a Title III
wiretap order might not be available.73 For the first time in the history of the court, its judgment was appealed.74 FISA had created a
foreign intelligence surveillance court of review.75 My colleague Senior Judge Laurence Silberman sits on that court. Until the Patriot
Act Amendment case,76 the review court had never sat. In its first
and, to date, only opinion, it reversed the FISA court and held that
the foreign intelligence wiretap could indeed be used in furtherance
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
69. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. (2002)).
70. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619-20 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002).
71. U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 291 (2001) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2003)).
72. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 622.
73. See id. at 623.
74. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
75. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(b) (2003).
76. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719-20.
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of criminal investigations so long as the gathering of foreign intelligence was a purpose of the tap.77
Whether you agree with the FISA court or the review court, that
case illustrates the principal role which courts must be conceded to
play in national security. We must function like courts. We must, in
cases properly brought before us and properly within our jurisdiction,
enter appropriate orders and judgments for relief when the political
branches, acting under the color of national security powers, have
unconstitutionally or otherwise unlawfully invaded the civil rights of
citizens or persons within our jurisdiction. Have we always performed that role well? Ask that question of Korematsu and the other
Japanese Americans who were driven from their homes and interned
during World War II. I am not passing on the policy question behind
what Roosevelt or the others did in those acts, but if you have never
read the Korematsu case,78 read it and reflect sometime on whether
the courts functioned very well in our conceded role in national security of adjudicating the question raised by the invasions of civil rights
by the political branches in the national security context. I hasten to
say that I am not suggesting that the Executive and the Legislative
branches cannot do things in emergencies which would be unconstitutional without the emergency. I am simply raising this question,
and this is one upon which I am venturing an answer: Do the courts
not still have a duty to pass on the constitutionality of what the other
branches have done? What sort of questions does that duty raise today? Is the concept of a military tribunal constitutional as a method
of adjudicating crimes? If so, who can those tribunals try? Can they
try American citizens? Can they try American citizens for acts
abroad but not domestic? I can answer none of these today, but I assume that I and other judges will have to answer these and a great
many more questions in days to come. The bar and the legal academy
must be prepared to defend on the one hand the civil rights of the
citizens of our country, and, on the other hand, the legitimate prerogatives of the government of this country. When the line between
those two is not clear, does not constitutional duty impose a role
upon the judiciary in national security affairs?
More controversially, back to the first question of whether and to
what extent the President may commit troops without congressional
declaration of war, and even without congressional authorization, Is
that a political question which the courts ought not address? The Supreme Court has not had occasion to provide a definitive answer to
that question, nor will I attempt to do so. I will say briefly that the
lower courts which have addressed the question cannot be accused of
77. Id. at 735-36.
78. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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unanimity. In Ange v. Bush,79 a district judge passed on a challenge
to the President’s deployment of U.S. military forces in the Persian
Gulf. The government defended in part on the political question theory.80 Judge Lamberth reviewed the six factors enumerated by the
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, for determining whether a question
is a political one:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches . . . or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.81

Judge Lamberth found the question of the commitment of armed
forces to be a political question under the textually demonstrable
commitment of war powers to the political branches, the due respect
theory, and the lack of judicial equipment to enter the field.82 In doing so, he took precedent from Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.83 It cannot
be said, however, that the Harisiades case, while certainly a legitimate precedent for Judge Lamberth’s reasoning, was in any way controlling. It dealt with a much more narrow question outside the area
of the use of forces, specifically the constitutionality of deporting a
legal resident alien because of his membership in the Communist
Party.84 Not only could Judge Lamberth not find a controlling precedent, but on the same date that he issued his decision in Ange v.
Bush, another judge of the District of Columbia District Court, Judge
Harold Greene, issued Dellums v. Bush,85 passing on a challenge to
the constitutionality of the same deployment brought by members of
Congress in which he determined that the question was not a political question outside judicial competence.86 He did not, however, rule
in favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting the suit on standing grounds.87 No
higher court has conclusively resolved the conflict.
Is the question a political one on which we cannot act? I already
telegraphed my stance. I am not going to answer it unless and until I
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
See id. at 511-15.
Id. at 512 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Id.
342 U.S. 580 (1952).
Id. at 581.
752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1149-51.
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meet it in an Article III context. These are but a few of the questions
that face the bench, the bar, and the legal academy in the field of national security law today, and while I have not attempted to answer
many of them, I will come out where I came in. The very fact that we
are asking these questions is strong evidence that national security
law is law: that the United States conducts its foreign affairs under
the rule of law. Has the United States done so perfectly for its entire
history? Of course not. Humans have not done anything perfectly,
nor may we expect perfection in this century. But we keep asking
these questions. And when it becomes appropriate, when it becomes
necessary, we answer them.

